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The Selig Case and Amortization of
Player Contracts: Baseball Continues
Its Winning Ways
By S. BARKSDALE PENICK *
I
Introduction
A recent federal district court opinion has added another
chapter to the continuing story of professional baseball's suc-
cess in the courtroom. In Selig v. United States,' a part owner
of the Milwaukee Brewers baseball team received an ex-
tremely favorable tax result, a result best explained by the
court's forthright adoption of a policy decision favoring
baseball.2
To some degree, all professional sports receive special treat-
ment under the law,3 but baseball has been treated even better
than other professional sports. In tort law, for example, own-
ers of baseball teams have been sued many times over the
years for injuries to spectators caused by foul balls or broken
bats.4 With few exceptions, baseball owners have escaped lia-
bility, usually by asserting an assumption of risk defense.5 By
contrast, courts have split where hockey owners have been
sued for injuries to spectators.6
* Member, Third Year Class; B.A., Dartmouth College, 1980. The author wishes
to thank Anne Hogg for her support through many drafts.
1. 565 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. Wis. 1983).
2. See infra text accompanying note 118.
3. For example, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982) exempts television pooling agreements
within a professional sports league from federal antitrust statutes. See Zaritsky, Taxa-
tion of Professional Sports Teams After 1976: A Whole New Ballgame, 18 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 679, 684 n.20 (1977).
4. See cases collected at Annot., 91 A.L.R.3d 24 (1979).
5. Id. at 32. The introduction of comparative negligence may erode the basis for
denying recovery to a spectator. See Akins v. Glens Falls City School Dist., 53 N.Y.2d
325, 424 N.E.2d 531, 441 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1981), where the Court of Appeals of New York
noted the New York cases barring recovery by a spectator on the grounds of assump-
tion of risk, and concluded that under comparative negligence a baseball owner might
be found liable. Id. at 331.
6. See cases collected at Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 1018 (1967).
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The most famous example of baseball's special treatment is
its unique antitrust exemption. The Supreme Court has con-
sistently held that baseball is not subject to the Sherman Act.7
The Court's initial rationale for this conclusion was that base-
ball was not "commerce" within the meaning of the Sherman
Act.8 In later cases the Court rested its decision on stare deci-
sis.9 The 1972 Flood decision has been described as a "cate-
chism of the virtues of organized baseball."'" The Selig
opinion voices similar approval of the national sport: "Baseball
is good for Americans (who can argue with this).""
The Selig dispute essentially involved a single issue-the
proper allocation of cost to player contracts purchased with a
sports franchise. Because player contracts are amortizable as-
sets, the allocation of cost to player contracts has significant
tax implications for owners of teams. Put simply, the higher
the allocation to player contracts, the greater the ensuing
amortization deductions. 1
2
The Selig opinion is the third in a line of cases involving allo-
cations to player contracts. In two earlier cases, Laird v.
United States, 3 dealing with the Atlanta Falcons football team,
and First Northwest Industries of America, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner," dealing with the Seattle SuperSonics basketball team,
the team owners attempted to allocate about ninety percent of
their respective purchase prices to player contracts. The Laird
court reduced the taxpayer's allocation to thirty-six percent, 15
while the First Northwest court reduced the allocation to
twenty-nine percent. 6 In Selig, the court allowed an allocation
of ninety-five percent to player contracts, 7 about three times
the level permitted in the earlier cases. The government has
7. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S.
356 (1953); Federal Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). See generally Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1973).
8. Federal Club v. National League, 259 U.S. at 208-09.
9. See Weistart, Player Discipline in Professional Sports. The Antitrust Issues, 18
WM. & MARY L. REV. 703, 704-05 n.7 (1977).
10. Morris, In the Wake of the Flood, 38 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBs. 85, 85 (1973).
11. Selig, 565 F. Supp. at 528.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 23-32.
13. 391 F. Supp. 656 (N.D. Ga. 1975), affid, 556 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied
434 U.S. 1014 (1978).
14. 70 T.C. 817 (1978), rev'd, 649 F.2d 707 (9th Cir. 1981).
15. Laird, 391 F. Supp. at 671.
16. First Northwest, 70 T.C. at 856.
17. Selig, 565 F. Supp. at 543. The total price was $10.8 million. The $10.2 million
allocation was equal to 95%.
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appealed the case to the Seventh Circuit, but at least at the
district court level, baseball continues to enjoy greater court-
room success than other professional sports.
This note begins by reviewing sports amortization practices
and the two earlier cases. It then considers the facts, holding
and rationale of the Selig case. This note then argues that the
cost allocation to player contracts in Selig is not supported by
the evidence and concludes that, on appeal, the allocation
should be overturned.
II
The Use of Sports Teams as Tax Shelters
As background to the Selig case, it is necessary to discuss
why the amortization of player contracts has important tax
consequences for purchasers of sports teams.
A professional sports franchise consists of a number of
rights and assets sold together as a package.18 Veteran player
contracts are one of the assets transferred when an established
sports team is sold; the player roster is simply included in the
package.' 9 When an expansion franchise is sold, however, no
such ongoing roster exists. To make new teams more competi-
tive, an expansion purchaser is normally allowed to select vet-
eran players from the rosters of established teams in the
league.20 Thus, in the sale of either an existing or an expansion
team, the new owner acquires the rights to the services of vet-
eran athletes.2' Other rights and assets acquired with a sports
18. See Note, Professional Sports Franchising and the IRS, 14 WASHBURN L.J. 321,
322-23 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as Note, Sports Franchising].
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Laird, 391 F. Supp. at 661.
21. Traditionally, ownership of a player's contract gave the team the exclusive
right to the athlete's services throughout his career. This was accomplished either
through the use of the reserve clause, which gave the team an indefinitely renewable
option, or by the application of compensation procedures for a team whose player was
signed by another team. See Zaritsky, supra note 3, at 691-92. In a series of cases in
the 1930's, the IRS argued that because of the reserve clause, baseball contracts had
more than a one year useful life, and therefore part of the cost of the contract should
be capitalized. The courts were not persuaded and allowed club owners to deduct the
contract cost. Commissioner v. Chicago Nat'l League Ball Club, 74 F.2d 1010 (7th Cir.
1935); Helvering v. Kansas City Am. Ass'n Baseball Co., 75 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1935);
Commissioner v. Pittsburgh Athletic Co., 72 F.2d 883 (3rd Cir. 1934). The IRS conceded
the issue for a number of years; however, in 1967 the IRS changed its position and
issued a revenue ruling taking notice of the reserve clause and the effective lifetime
nature of a professional sports contract. Rev. Rul. 67-379, 1967-2 C.B. 127. Ironically,
this change of position by the IRS came just before the rise of free agency and the
No. 2]
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franchise may include television rights, local monopoly on the
league's product, college draft rights, the right to share in fu-
ture expansion benefits, radio rights, a share of the league's
goodwill, and sports equipment.22
Most of these rights are intangible rights that may last indefi-
nitely.23 Only player contracts and sports equipment necessar-
ily diminish in value with the passage of time; bats and balls
wear out and players get older. Because of this deterioration,
the cost of acquiring sports equipment and player contracts
may be deducted from gross income over the useful life of each
asset.24 These deductions are termed "depreciation" for tangi-
ble assets such as sports equipment, and "amortization" for in-
tangible assets such as player contracts.25 The group of non-
amortizable intangibles that makes up the rest of the package
is often referred to collectively as the "franchise assets," or
sometimes simply as the "franchise. '26
A purchaser must allocate the price for the entire team
among the various assets purchased to reflect the cost of each
item.27 Whatever portion of the price is allocated to deprecia-
ble or amortizable assets may be written off as deductions. 28
Tangible assets, such as sports equipment, are depreciable but
comprise only a small part of the overall value of a team. 29 By
contrast, player contracts are among a team's most valuable as-
sets." Because player contracts are the only significant amor-
dilution of the effectiveness of the reserve clause. See generally Zaritsky, supra note 3,
at 694-95; see also text accompanying notes 122-24.
22. See Weill, Depreciation of Player Contracts-The Government is Ahead at the
Half, 53 TAXES 581, 584-87 (1975).
23. An asset such as goodwill may decline over time, but if it does, it will be for
reasons other than the passage of time.
24. I.R.C. § 167(a) provides that there shall be allowed as a deduction a reasonable
allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear of property used in the taxpayer's trade or
business. Congress has since enacted I.R.C. § 168, which alters the rules for deprecia-
tion of tangible personal property, but this would not affect the treatment of an intangi-
ble asset such as player contracts. See J. FREELAND, S. LIND & R. STEPHENS,
FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 732 (4th ed. 1982).
25. See Comment, Federal Income Tax-Amortization and the Expansion Sports
Franchise-First Northwest Industries of America, Inc. v. Commissioner, 54 WASH. L.
REV. 827, 827 n.2 (1979).
26. See Note, Sports Franchising, supra note 18, at 321.
27. Zaritsky, supra note 3, at 688; see Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570, 572 (2d
Cir. 1945).
28. See supra note 24.
29. H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2897, 2975 [hereinafter cited as House Report ].
30. Id. at 2973.
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tizable asset transferred with a sports team, the allocation to
player contracts effectively determines the total amount of de-
ductions flowing from the purchase of a franchise." Because
player contracts are amortizable while franchise rights are not,
the "entire tax future of a team can depend upon the portion of
its capital that is invested in each of the two assets."32
Amortization of player contracts has been a flexible tax shel-
tering tool, in part because of the nature of the asset. Purchas-
ers make their own determinations as to the allocations for
player contracts, subject to a test of reasonableness. 3 3 Because
the value of such human assets is difficult to measure objec-
tively, it is possible to inflate the allocation to player contracts
without arousing too much attention.
Purchasers also make their own estimates of the useful life
of the asset, the period over which deductions are taken.3 4 The
useful life of a group of player contracts is equated with the
estimated average playing careers of the athletes,3 another fig-
ure difficult to measure precisely. Estimates of average play-
ing careers have usually ranged from three to six years,36
although one estimate was as short as eighteen months,
thereby allowing a quick write-off. 37
Purchasers, therefore, have a measure of control over both
the total amount to be amortized and the period of amortiza-
tion which allows them to structure the transaction within rea-
sonable bounds to meet particular needs8.3  The benefit from
the deductions thus can be predicted accurately before
purchasing a team and does not depend on the success of the
team on the field or at the gate.
Until the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 39 the advan-
tages to owners of sports teams were even greater. While it is
in the purchaser's interest to have a high allocation to player
contracts, the seller's interest is best served by a low allocation
31. See id. at 2976; see also Zaritsky, supra note 3, at 688.
32. Zaritsky, supra note 3, at 688.
33. Note, Sports Franchising, supra note 18, at 323.
34. See House Report, supra note 29, at 2977.
35. Note, Sports Franchising, supra note 18, at 324.
36. House Report, supra note 29, at 2977.
37. See Note, Sports Franchising, supra note 18, at 324.
38. See Jones, Amortization and Nonamortization of Intangibles in the Sports
World, 53 TAXES 777, 781 (1975).
39. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976) (codified at 26
U.S.C. §§ 1056-1254 (1976)).
No. 21
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to avoid recapture provisions that might force the seller to rec-
ognize part of the gain from the sale of the team as ordinary
income rather than as capital gain.40 Despite their opposing in-
terests, the buyer and seller of a team, before 1977, were not
required to agree upon a single allocation for use by both-
each could provide his own allocation as long as it was reason-
able.4 Naturally, buyers routinely allocated far more to player
contracts than did sellers.42
Since there were no effective restraints on allocations to
player contracts, it became standard practice to allocate most
of the cost of the team to player contracts. 43 For example, be-
tween 1966 and 1974 the National Basketball Association added
nine expansion teams. Each purchaser allocated about ninety
percent of the cost of the team to player contracts."
The tax treatment of professional sports owners before 1976
was so beneficial that it has been characterized as a "state of
grace within the tax laws. ' 45 These benefits have been credited
with fueling the tremendous expansion of professional sports
in the 1960's and early 1970's.46 The tax laws have also been
criticized as having encouraged instability in franchise owner-
ship. Whatever the exact effects of amortization of player
contracts, there is little doubt that sports teams were prone to
abusive tax shelter practices under pre-1976 law.
III
The Tax Reform Act of 1976
Attention began to focus on sports tax practices in 1974 when
40. Horvitz & Hoffman, New Tax Developments in the Syndication of Sports
Franchises, 54 TAXES 175, 177 (1976). Sellers might have been forced to recognize as
ordinary income the portion of the gain on the sale of a franchise attributable to player
contracts whose bases had been depreciated below the amount realized on the sale of
the contracts. I.R.C. § 1245(a) (4) (A). This problem would only arise where the seller
of a team still had players on the team left over from his original purchase. See gener-
ally House Report, supra note 29, at 2976-77.
41. Zaritsky, supra note 3, at 689.
42. See House Report, supra note 29, at 2976.
43. See id. at 2974.
44. First Northwest, 70 T.C. at 832. For a detailed account of how one owner was
able to use these tax strategies to his financial benefit, see Note, The Professional
Sports Team as a Tax Shelter-A Case Study: The Utah Stars, 1974 UTAH L. REv. 556
[hereinafter referred to as Note, Utah Stars].
45. Zaritsky, supra note 3, at 679.
46. See id. at 679 n.2. See also Note, Sports Franchising, supra note 18, at 321.
47. See Note, Utah Stars, supra note 44, at 569. See also Note, Sports Franchising,
supra note 18, at 329.
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the Laird case was tried. Several law review articles appeared
detailing the amortization benefits available to purchasers of
sports teams.48 The House Ways and Means Committee con-
sidered some tax curbs on the sports industry in 1974, but they
were never reported out of committee. 49 Later, the issue arose
in preparation for the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1976. One of
the main purposes of this statute was to restrict abusive tax
shelters,5" and by this time, Congress was persuaded that con-
straints on sports teams were necessary. It enacted three pro-
visions specifically applicable to sports teams: (1) the creation
of a rebuttable presumption that no more than fifty percent of
the cost of a team was properly allocable to player contracts;
5 1
(2) a requirement that purchaser and seller use consistent al-
locations;52 and (3) a special depreciation recapture provision
for sports teams. 53 The final report of the House Select Com-
mittee on Professional Sports stated that the "new tax provi-
sions applicable to professional sports will surely be effective
in reducing tax shelter abuses to the extent they have oc-
curred. '5 4 One commentator on the sports provisions felt that
they were more than corrective: "1976 marked a dramatic alter-
ation in the taxation of professional sports teams. Owners of
professional teams now find themselves forced from a state of
grace within the tax laws that had helped promote the incredi-
bly rapid growth of the sports industry. '55
The sports provisions of the TRA of 1976 were intended and
expected to significantly alter the amortization of player con-
tracts. However, all three cases, Laird, First Northwest and
Selig, arose from transactions in taxable years prior to 1976.
The corrective measures passed by Congress would have only
prospective application, so it was up to the IRS to attack alloca-
tions made under prior law.
48. Note, Utah Stars, supra note 44, was the first article dealing with the subject.
49. Wiesner, Tax Shelters-A Survey of the Impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1976,
33 TAx L. REV. 5, 88 (1977).
50. House Report, supra note 29, at 2903.
51. I.R.C. § 1056(d).
52. I.R.C. § 1056(a).
53. I.R.C. § 1245(a) (4). See Wiesner, supra note 49, at 91-93.
54. SELECT COMMrrEE ON PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, INQUIRY INTO PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS: FINAL REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 1786, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 107 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as FINAL REPORT].
55. Zaritsky, supra note 3, at 679.
No. 21
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IV
Laird
Laird v. United States, 6 the first case to address the amorti-
zation of player contracts, grew out of the formation of the At-
lanta Falcons football team in 1965. E. Cody Laird was a
member of the 'Five Smiths,' the group of investors that
purchased the franchise from the National Football League
(NFL) and its member teams for $8,500,000Y.5 The NFL and the
Five Smiths agreed to structure the deal as the purchase of
forty-two veteran players from the existing NFL teams for
$8,450,000, which in effect allocated nearly one hundred percent
of the purchase price to player contracts.58 On his tax return,
Laird reduced the allocation to player contracts to ninety-one
percent ($7.7 million) to account for an allocation to interest.59
Pursuant to an audit, the Internal Revenue Service reduced
the allocation to player contracts to $1.05 million, approxi-
mately twelve percent of the cost of the franchise.60 The other
eighty-eight percent of the cost of the franchise was found by
the IRS to comprise non-amortizable franchise rights." Laird
sued for a refund in the District Court of Northern Georgia.
The trial was held in 1974, and was accompanied by wide-
spread publicity.62 In 1974, the IRS placed all cases involving
this issue "in suspense," ordering agents not to close such
cases until Laird was concluded. 3 The IRS accumulated over
130 cases in suspense, pending resolution of this case.64 A law-
yer for the Justice Department stated that the government
wished to demonstrate in Laird that it would "no longer accept
the arbitrary valuations placed on player contracts for depreci-
"165ation purposes.
At the trial, the government went further than merely argu-
ing for a low allocation and tried to demonstrate why it should
56. 391 F. Supp. 656 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
57. Id. at 661.
58. Id. at 660.
59. Id. at 658. The reallocation to account for interest was not detrimental to Laird
since interest payments are deductible under I.R.C. § 163(a).
60. Laird, 391 F. Supp. at 569.
61. Id.
62. See Wiesner, supra note 49, at 87.
63. FiNAL REPORT, supra note 54, at 94-95.
64. Id.
65. Weill, supra note 22, at 584.
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not have to accept any allocation at all to player contracts. 66 If
it had been successful, this argument would have eliminated
all amortization deductions for the Five Smiths. The govern-
ment argued that an accurate allocation was not possible
among the assets of a sports franchise, that a sports team was a
bundle of related assets whose values were too closely tied to
one another to allow accurate allocation.67 This line of reason-
ing, otherwise known as the "mass asset theory," had been
sporadically applied in a number of different areas without
much success. 68 The Fifth Circuit had considered the mass as-
set theory in 1973, and after reviewing the cases that suppos-
edly had applied the theory, it determined that in most of these
cases the taxpayers had actually failed to carry their eviden-
tiary burdens.69
The government's choice of the bundle of rights/mass asset
theory as its chief argument in Laird seems surprising since
any appeal would be to the Fifth Circuit, which had so recently
criticized the theory. Furthermore, the earlier cases purport-
ing to apply the mass asset theory had involved much smaller
amounts of money than the millions of dollars in potential
taxes at stake in Laird .70 This added financial incentive made
it certain that Laird would avoid an evidentiary failure, if it was
at all possible. Perhaps the government took an unlikely gam-
ble with the mass asset theory because, if it had been success-
ful, it would have taught the owners a lesson and provided a
strong bargaining chip in settling the cases held in suspense.
The government supported the mass asset theory by offering
evidence of projected values for all the assets acquired by the
Five Smiths, including some rather vague assets such as a
share of the NFL's goodwill and the local monopoly on the
league's product.7 ' When added together, these projected val-
ues totalled about twice as much as the Five Smiths had paid.72
The government's point was that the values of the assets in a
66. See Laird, 391 F. Supp. at 659-60.
67. Id.
68. For a list of cases dealing with the mass asset theory, see Comment, supra
note 25, at 833-34.
69. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1240, 1249-50 (5th
Cir. 1973). The case involved the sale of a newspaper; the government alleged that the
list of subscribers constituted a mass asset.
70. For example, Boe v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 720 (1961), was a mass asset case
where the amount in dispute was approximately $30,000. Id.
71. See Laird v. United States, 556 F.2d 1224, 1232 n.13 (5th Cir. 1977).
72. See id. at 1232.
No. 21
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team exist only in the context of each other, and therefore can-
not be found to have a separable value.73 The district court was
not persuaded that an accurate allocation to player contracts
was impossible, and accordingly rejected the bundle of rights/
mass asset theory.74
As an alternative, the government also presented expert tes-
timony by an economist who estimated the value of the con-
tracts at about $1.4 million.75 This evidence was later described
by the appellate court as "thoroughly unpersuasive."'76
Laird then presented two NFL executives who testified as to
the fair market value of the contracts. One estimated $6.8 mil-
lion, and the other $7.3 million.77 On this basis, Laird con-
tended that the $7.7 million allocation was reasonable. 78 The
court, however, found that Laird's allocation was simply too
high and did not "reflect economic reality. ''79
While the court decided that an accurate allocation was pos-
sible, it rejected the estimated worth of the contracts offered
by the parties, and therefore had to establish the allocation on
its own. The court noted that no allocation had been made by
the Five Smiths to rights under the existing national television
contract, which the court found to deserve an allocation of $4.3
million, the present value of amounts due the Falcons over
four years under the then-existing national television con-
tract.8 0 The court then subtracted the $4.3 million from the to-
tal amount in dispute, $7.7 million, leaving a remainder of $3.4
million.8 The court characterized the remainder as the total
amount available for allocation to player contracts.82 The court
eventually accepted a compromise allocation of $3 million of-
fered by Laird some months after the trial.83 The Five Smiths
were therefore eligible to write off about thirty-five percent of
the cost of the team in amortization deductions.
Laird appealed to the Fifth Circuit on another issue,84 and
73. Id.
74. Laird, 391 F. Supp. at 670.
75. Laird v. United States, 556 F.2d at 1238 n.22.
76. Id.
77. Laird, 391 F. Supp. at 666.
78. See id.
79. Id. at 669.
80. Id. at 664.
81. Id. at 664-65.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 667.
84. Laird appealed on the ground that the cost of acquiring television rights should
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the government cross-appealed, arguing that (1) the mass as-
set theory should be applied, and (2) the trial court's allocation
was unsupported by the evidence. The court predictably re-
jected the mass asset theory." The government supported its
second point by attacking the "subtraction method" employed
by the district court and arguing that in subtracting the value
of the television rights from the total amount in dispute, and
allocating most of the remainder to player contracts, the court
had not accounted for the values of any other rights acquired
by the Five Smiths.86
In support of its position, the government pointed to its pro-
jected value of the entire package of rights, and argued that
where such a projection totals more than was paid, the lower
court should be required to make findings as to the value of
each right acquired. 7 The assumption was that such findings
would necessarily reduce the amount allocable to player con-
tracts. This scarcely seems to have been a practical sugges-
tion, for the lower court would have been required to make
specific findings as to the value of such nebulous assets as a
local NFL monopoly or a share of the NFL's goodwill.
The Fifth Circuit agreed that the subtraction method used by
the lower court had been improper, but held that this did not
necessarily invalidate the allocation.88 The court stated:
The fact that the valuation method adopted by the district
court arrived at what was, in essence, a compromise ... in no
way diminishes the validity of that valuation. The district
court was called upon to measure the worth of men, not ma-
chinery, a task of no small proportions. In a situation like the
one at bar, arriving at a compromise figure was an acceptable
valuation solution. 89
The appellate court was not willing to reject the trial court's
allocation merely because of the possibility of overallocation,
holding that valuation of every right was not required by the
Treasury regulations.9 0
While the government had failed in its attempt to preclude
be considered amortizable. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's rejection of
this contention. Laird v. United States, 556 F.2d at 1235.
85. Id. at 1231-35.
86. Id. at 1241.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1242.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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entirely amortization of player contracts, it was regarded as
the victor in the Laird case. This decision was viewed as a
step toward clamping down on tax abuse in the sports indus-
try." The widespread publicity that accompanied the Laird
case has been credited with having prompted Congress to in-
clude the sports provisions in the TRA of 1976.92 Furthermore,
this publicity meant that owners could no longer safely assume
their allocations to player contracts would go unnoticed.
V
First Northwest
The second major case dealing with the amortization of
player contracts, First Northwest Industries of America, Inc. v.
Commissioner," arose from the 1967 formation of the Seattle
SuperSonics basketball team. A group of investors purchased
the expansion franchise for $1.75 million, and allocated $1.6
million to player contracts, about ninety-one percent of the to-
tal price.94 The IRS reduced the allocation to $450,000, and the
taxpayer filed suit in the Tax Court.
Despite the rejection of the mass asset theory in Laird, the
government again asserted that theory in First Northwest.9'
The IRS had some grounds for hoping for better success in
First Northwest, as the trial was in the Tax Court and any ap-
peal was to the Ninth Circuit, both of which had previously ap-
proved the mass asset theory. 6 The trial was held after the
enactment of the TRA of 1976, although, as noted above, the
case concerned transactions arising under previous law. While
it may have been technically plausible to contend that amorti-
zation of player contracts should be disallowed, this contention
is clearly not consonant with the Congressional intent of the
law. The legislative history of the TRA of 1976 shows that Con-
gress considered amortization of player contracts permissible
91. See Weill, supra note 22, at 582-84.
92. See Weisner, supra note 53, at 87-94.
93. 70 T.C. 817 (1978).
94. Id. at 822.
95. Id. at 844.
96. Tomlinson v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 570 (1972); Credit Bureau of Erie, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C. 726 (1970); Boe v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 720 (1961), affd, 307
F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1962). The cases all involved the sale of an ongoing business where
one of the assets transferred was a list of customers. The government successfully
argued in these cases that such a list was a mass asset. See Comment, supra note 25,
at 829.
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under pre-1976 law.17 The Fifth Circuit had taken note of the
TRA of 1976 in Laird,98 and the Tax Court mentioned the stat-
ute in First Northwest.9 9 Thus it was not surprising that the
Tax Court found the mass asset theory inapplicable to sports
teams,'00 and thereby laid to rest the government's efforts to
prevent amortization of player contracts. 10
As an alternative to the mass asset theory, the government
presented expert testimony by an economist who estimated
the value of the contracts at $60,000.102 As a further alternative,
the government requested that in any event the allocation by
the court should not exceed the $450,000 figure reached on au-
dit by the IRS. 103
The taxpayer did not try to support his original allocation of
$1.6 million at trial, a tacit concession that this previous alloca-
tion of ninety-one percent was unreasonable. The taxpayer
presented testimony from three basketball executives: two es-
timated the value of the players at $850,000, and one estimated
the value at $875,000.14
The court was thus offered a variety of suggestions as to the
proper allocation, but as in Laird, was not satisfied with any of
them. As for the government witness who had testified to a
$60,000 allocation, the court stated that "[w] ith all due respect
to the witness as an economist, we find that bottom line figure
ridiculous. We disregard it entirely."'105 The taxpayer's wit-
nesses were more credible, but apparently not entirely con-
97. Since Congress considered the issue of amortization of player contracts, and
then tightened the rules, it can be inferred that Congress assumed player contracts
were amortizable under pre-1976 law.
98. Laird v. United States, 556 F.2d at 1241.
99. First Northwest, 70 T.C. at 857-58.
100. The court's rationale for finding that the mass asset theory did not apply was
that the taxpayer had shown that certain rights had a separate ascertainable value, a
limited useful life, and were separable from goodwill. This reasoning supports the con-
tention that the mass asset theory is not an independent doctrine and appears to suc-
ceed only where a taxpayer fails to sustain his burden of proof at trial, for regardless of
the putative application of the theory, an asset shown to have a separate ascertainable
value, apart from goodwill, and a limited useful life will be amortizable. See Houston
Chronicle, 481 F.2d at 1249.
101. The government did not argue the mass asset theory in the Selig case. Ironi-
cally, the Selig opinion mentioned the mass asset theory and characterized it as eco-
nomically accurate. 565 F. Supp. at 526-27.
102. First Northwest, 70 T.C. at 853.
103. Id. at 842.
104. Id. at 850-51.
105. Id. at 853-54.
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vincing, as the court found their allocations too high. °6
The Tax Court, like the district court in Laird, having dis-
missed the allocations made by the parties, was forced to pro-
vide its own allocation. The court announced its finding as
follows:
Clearly, we are presented with a difficult task, but, after careful
study of a record consisting of 1,700 pages of testimony and
over two hundred exhibits, we hold that it amply and reason-
ably supports a finding that of the $1.75 million purchase price
a fair market value of $500,000 is allocable to expansion player
rights.10 7
The court did not detail its exact method of reaching the
$500,000 figure. It is clear the court considered the value of at
least two other rights in making its decision-television rights
and rights to share in proceeds of future expansion which was
already planned at the time. 0 8 The court did not provide ac-
tual values for these rights; apparently they were weighed into
the final compromise.
After Laird and First Northwest, the law concerning amorti-
zation of player contracts seemed fairly well settled in most
regards. The government had clearly failed with the mass as-
set theory. Not surprisingly, sports industry executives were
more convincing than economists at estimating the value of
player contracts. Each case allowed about one third of the to-
tal cost of the franchise to be allocated to player contracts.
While the cases reached consistent results, it is perhaps most
significant that they were unable to articulate a satisfactory
method of allocating value to player contracts. 109
A period of laxity towards sports tax practices had been fol-
lowed by a move to increase scrutiny and tighten the rules of
the game; 110 after First Northwest it appeared that an equilib-
rium had been reached. The controversy over amortization of
player contracts died down and law review interest in the issue
106. Id.
107. Id. at 856 (footnote omitted).
108. Id. at 860-66.
109. The government's reliance in both Laird and First Northwest on the mass as-
set theory may be partly to blame for the failure to develop a reliable method of allo-
cating cost to player contracts. By focusing its energies on the attempt to persuade the
court that an accurate allocation was not possible, the government failed to address
sufficiently the question of how such an allocation should be made if allowed by the
court.
110. See supra text accompanying note 55.
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waned."' No cases were reported on the subject from 1978 un-
til 1983, when the Selig opinion appeared.
VI
Selig
Selig v. United States" 2 involved the formation of the Mil-
waukee Brewers. The story of the Brewers perhaps begins
with the transfer of the Boston Braves to Milwaukee in 1953,
giving Milwaukee a major league baseball team for the first
time since before the turn of the century.13 The Braves were
extremely popular from the start in Milwaukee, and even more
so when they won the National League pennant in 1957 and
1958. Yet while the team was popular, the Braves did not make
money in Milwaukee, and against the wishes of many local
sports fans, the Braves moved in 1965 to Atlanta.1
4
Bud Selig had been a shareholder of the Braves in Milwau-
kee, and when the team left, he set about trying to bring base-
ball back to Milwaukee." 5 Selig formed the Milwaukee
Brewers organization in 1965. The group applied for American
League membership in 1966 and 1967, and for National League
membership in 1966, 1967 and 1968. The group also tried to
purchase existing teams, and had nearly obtained the Chicago
White Sox in 1969 when the deal fell through. Later in 1969, the
Milwaukee group reached an agreement to buy the Seattle Pi-
lots, a struggling team that had entered the American League
two years before. The deal was delayed when other American
League owners refused to approve the transfer, but the league
owners capitulated when the Pilots filed for bankruptcy and a
court ordered the sale of the team." 6 The team has played in
Milwaukee since that time, and in 1983, the Brewers won the
American League pennant and brought the World Series back
to Milwaukee.
Meanwhile, the IRS challenged the allocation to player con-
111. Of the ten articles cited in this note, eight appeared between 1974-1978, and
only two after that period.
112. 565 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. Wis. 1983). For a general discussion of the Seliv case, see
Harwood, Valuation of Player Contracts When Acquiring a Professional Baseball
Team-an Analysis of Selig v. United States, 61 TAXES 670 (1983).
113. Milwaukee had a National League team for a single season, 1878, when it fin-
ished in last place. BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA 110 (J. Reichler ed. 1982).
114. Selig, 565 F. Supp. at 530.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 530-32.
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tracts made by Bud Selig in connection with the purchase of
the team." 7 Selig filed suit in the federal district court, and the
case came to trial in Milwaukee shortly after the World Series.
Whether or not the court was influenced by the recent success
and popularity of the Brewers, the opinion straightforwardly
voiced an approving and paternalistic attitude toward baseball:
Baseball is good for Americans (who can argue with this), but
from a business standpoint, much to my surprise, professional
baseball generally is unprofitable. Recognizing that baseball is
good for Americans, the courts and Congress have helped pro-
fessional clubs by taxing them as businesses and by histori-
cally exempting professional baseball from the antitrust
laws."
8
The court did not view the Justice Department quite so fa-
vorably. The court stated, "Throughout this case the Govern-
ment has intimated that there exists in organized baseball a
conspiracy to deprive the government of its taxes.""' 9
Perhaps by then, the steam had simply gone out of the move
to restrict sports tax practices; whatever the reason, the court
did not view the case as an effort to curb tax abuse. The court
noted that "each side operated on premises inapposite to the
other's case."'2 0 The court seemed to have found the two ap-
proaches irreconcilable, and made an initial policy decision in
favor of baseball. The tone of the entire opinion reflected this
pro-baseball attitude.
Before discussing the arguments and evidence offered at
trial, the court surveyed the three markets in which player con-
tracts are bought and sold: the club market, the player market,
and the free agent market. The club market includes only
those sales of player contracts that accompany the sale of a
franchise, the type of sale involved in Selig. 2 ' The player mar-
ket consists of transactions between clubs-the trading, buy-
ing, and selling of players. 122 The player market was the
exclusive market, other than franchise sales, until the recent
rise of free agency. In the free agent market, clubs compete to
purchase the contract of a player no longer bound to any one
117. Id. at 525.
118. Id. at 528.
119. Id. at 527.
120. Id. at 526.
121. Id. at 530.
122. Id. at 529.
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team.123 The court cautioned that because these three markets
had different characteristics, evidence of transactions in one
market might not be relevant to transactions in another.
124
The court then turned to the theories offered by the parties.
The group including Selig had purchased the Seattle franchise
for $10.8 million, and allocated $10.2 million to player contracts,
about ninety-four percent of the price. 25 In addition to Seat-
tle's major league roster, the Brewers received over one hun-
dred minor league players, for a total of 149 players
transferred. 26
At the trial, Selig showed that the $10.2 million allocation had
been based on four appraisals of the players which were made
shortly after the 1970 purchase. 27 The appraisals had been
made by four men with considerable baseball experience and
were based on personal observations, scouting reports, statis-
tics and conversations with baseball executives. In making
their valuations, the appraisers did not know what amount had
been allocated by the club owners to player contracts, but they
did know that $10.8 million had been the total price of the
team. 28 As the court noted, it was common knowledge in the
baseball industry in 1970 that purchasers of teams allocated
most of the price to player contracts. 129 Since the valuations
were made by baseball executives who understood the signifi-
cance of allocations to player contracts, it is not surprising that
all of the valuations totalled about $10 million.30 After having
raised the issue of potential bias, the court dismissed it by con-
cluding that the appraisals were trustworthy and supportive of
the $10.2 million.131
As further support, the taxpayer offered evidence of the cost
of developing a major league ballplayer through the minor
leagues. At the time of the purchase of the Brewers, major
league teams spent between $1 million and $1.4 million yearly
on their minor league systems.132 On the average, a team
123. Id. at 529-30.
124. Id. at 528-29.
125. Id. at 525.
126. Id. at 532.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 534.
129. Id.
130. Of the four valuations, two were about $10.3 million, and two were about $9.7
million. Id. at 532.
131. Id. at 534.
132. Id.
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moved two to four players per year from the minors to the ma-
jors."' Dividing the overall cost to a team by the number of
players it developed through the minor league system resulted
in a rough figure of $350,000 per player. When multiplied by the
number of players on a major league roster (twenty-five) this
comparison yields a figure of $8.7 million for the cost of a roster
of major league players.3 Using this analysis, the taxpayer
contended that an overall allocation to player contracts of $10.2
million is reasonable because of the minor league players also
transferred. 35
The relevance of this evidence seems questionable, for it as-
sumes there is a logical connection between the cost of sup-
porting a minor league team and the price paid by Selig for the
player contracts. Any such logical connection is tenuous at
best. Nonetheless, the court found this line of reasoning credi-
ble and supportive of the taxpayer's allocation. 36
The taxpayer further supported his $10.2 million allocation
by (1) showing that the team carried insurance on the players
worth $11.3 million;' 37 (2) arguing that because the Milwaukee
metropolitan area was a poor prospect for financial success,
franchise rights other than player contracts had little value;' 38
and (3) offering evidence of transactions in the free agent mar-
ket which supported a high valuation of player contracts. 39
The court commented favorably on all three points.'4 °
The court then turned to the government's case in a section
of the opinion titled "The Government's Evaluations of the
Player Contracts are Unreliable and Irrelevant."' 4 ' The gov-
ernment presented two expert witnesses in an attempt to
counter Selig's allocation. One witness, Dewey Soriano, who
had been president of the Seattle organization, testified to an
allocation of an estimated $3.2 million. 42 The court noted that
this allocation, unlike the taxpayer's, was "made twelve years
after the fact and [was] based primarily on memory."'143 The
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 534-35.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 535.
138. Id. at 535-36.
139. Id. at 536.
140. Id. at 534-36.
141. Id. at 536.
142. Id. at 541.
143. Id.
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court also noted that in the negotiations for the sale of the Se-
attle team, Soriano had characterized Seattle's players as quite
valuable.' Because of this inconsistency, the court found
Soriano's testimony unreliable. 4 ' The government's other ex-
pert witness, Richard Walsh, had been general manager of the
California Angels from 1968 to 1971.146 Walsh's allocation, also
made twelve years after the fact, was based primarily upon a
review of player statistics. 47 The court criticized Walsh for us-
ing data from player market transactions to arrive at his alloca-
tion for the club market transaction and declined to give his
testimony much weight. 148
The government also presented several theories based on
economic analyses. One of these theories was the "going con-
cern" argument, according to which the entire investment in
the Brewers could not be considered a business investment.
149
Rather, the franchise was an investment with both pleasure
and business motives, much as one might purchase a small air-
plane for both business and pleasure.5 0 In a situation involv-
ing mixed investment motives, only that portion attributable to
business motives may be eligible for amortization.' 5 ' The gov-
ernment's economist, Dr. Roger Noll, tried to show that the re-
turn that would be received on the investment was not enough
to justify, on business grounds, an investment of $10.8
million.'52
With the going concern argument, the government was at-
tempting to challenge the court's assumption that Selig's in-
vestment was purely a business investment. However, the
court was unwilling to alter its initial assumptions:
Purchasing a major league baseball club is not a wise invest-
ment from the standpoint of rate of return on investment, but it
is nevertheless still a business investment. For the reasons
stated in my discussion of the assumptions that underlie this
decision this Court cannot allocate part of the $10.8 million
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 541-42.
147. Id. at 542.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 536-37.
150. Cf. Sharp v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 743, (D. Del. 1961), affd, 303 F.2d 783
(3rd Cir. 1962) (dealing with the gain on the sale of an airplane used for both business
and pleasure).
151. Id. at 744.
152. Selig, 565 F. Supp. at 536-37.
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purchase price to the emotional aspects of the purchase
153
The government also developed two economic models for de-
termining the worth of player contracts. One of these, an in-
come sensitivity analysis, measured the value of the player
contracts by determining the portion of team revenue affected
by the quality of team play.154 The court found the allocation
produced by this method to be arbitrary and not necessarily
relevant to the case. 155
The second economic model was a regression analysis which
produced an equation to predict market value based on infor-
mation such as the player's statistics, age, and salary level.
15 6
Based on this method, Dr. Noll testified that one could be
ninety-eight percent certain that the true value of the player
contracts was between $.5 million and $1.5 million.'57 The
court, however, was one hundred percent sure that the regres-
sion analysis could not be trusted.158 The court found fault
with both the data base and the method used to derive the
equation. 59 The court also criticized Dr. Noll for failing to dis-
tinguish transactions in the player market from those in the
club market, saying the two were "totally different
market [ s "160
The government further attempted to discredit some of the
allocations to specific players by showing that some players
who had been assigned high values were released shortly
thereafter.' 61 The court answered this argument by stating
that the release of a player in the player market has nothing to
do with his value in the club market.162 The court stated that
"[t]he government's argument totally confuses the two mar-
kets."'63 Yet, surely there is some correlation between values
in the two markets; if a player has a low enough value in the
player market to be released, then he cannot have a high value
in the club market. In the opinion, the court faulted the gov-
153. Id. at 537.
154. Id. at 541.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 537-40.
157. Id. at 539.
158. Id. at 541.
159. Id. at 539-41.
160. Id. at 539.
161. Id. at 533.
162. Id. at 534.
163. Id.
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ernment three times for failing to distinguish the player mar-
ket from the club market.'64 Earlier, by contrast, the court had
considered free agent market evidence offered by the taxpayer,
and had commented favorably on it. 6 ' The court was thus
quick to point out any potential flaw in the government's argu-
ments, on grounds of relevance, bias or credibility, while ap-
proving of all the taxpayer's theories, even the logically
unpersuasive comparison to minor league costs. In essence,
the court seemed predisposed to reject the government's
position.
The court concluded that Selig had demonstrated that the
player contracts had a fair market value of $10.2 million.166 The
court then applied what it termed "generally accepted account-
ing principles" which called for allocations to be made to as-
sets to reflect their fair market value. 67
Other than player contracts, the only asset valued by the
court was sports equipment, which was given an allocation of
$100,000.168 The court thus allocated $10.2 million to player con-
tracts and $100,000 to sports equipment, leaving a $500,000 re-
mainder to account for the other franchise rights. 69  This
allocation by "generally accepted accounting principles" is
equivalent to the subtraction method that was disapproved of
by the Fifth Circuit in Laird.170 The flaw in this method lies in
the distinct possibility that some valuable rights may not be
given sufficient consideration. Among the franchise assets
were television rights. Data attached in the appendix to the
case shows that the Brewers received local television revenues
of $600,000 in 1970 and 1971, and combined local and national
revenues of $1.3 million in the years 1972-1975.171 The sums
generated by television rights suggest that this asset alone was
worth more than the $500,000 remainder. The Laird court had
specifically accounted for television rights. 72 The Selig court
should have done the same.
The allocation of $10.2 million allowed by the court does not
164. See supra text accompanying notes 148, 160 & 163.
165. See supra text accompanying note 140.
166. Selig, 565 F. Supp. at 543.
167. Id. at 526-27.
168. Id. at 532.
169. Id. at 543.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 80-82.
171. Selig, 565 F. Supp. at 545.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 80-82.
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make economic sense. The court attempted to rationalize the
result:
It is economically impossible to separate the value of the
franchise from the value of the player contracts for, in fact, one
is valueless without the other .... Although it is a legal fic-
tion that one can allocate part of the purchase price of a base-
ball club to the franchise and part to the player contracts in an
economically sensible manner, it is the law that we have to al-
locate .... Once it is accepted that the allocation of the price
among the assets is the law, then we are relieved of trying to
explain it in rational economic terms and can proceed to test
the reasonableness of the allocation in terms of generally ac-
cepted accounting principles and legal requirements. This pro-
cess is necessarily arbitrary from an economic standpoint
173
The court's reasoning had begun with certain assumptions
about the nature and status of professional sports. Judge
Reynolds wrote, "[Alt the outset I will set forth the assump-
tions (i.e. conclusions of law) that underlie my decision and
which pretty much determine the outcome of the case ....
When these assumptions led to an illogical result, the court ex-
plained the result on the basis of those same assumptions.
This circular reasoning provides a weak explanation for the il-
logical result.
VII
Comparison
In comparing Selig with Laird and First Northwest, the most
significant and obvious difference is that the Selig court al-
lowed ninety-five percent of the purchase price to be allocated
to player contracts, 175 a percentage about three times the level
permitted in the earlier cases.
It might be argued that the facts and circumstances of the
Selig case are sufficiently distinguishable from the earlier
cases to justify the higher allocation. It is true that the Selig
group purchased an established team instead of the expansion
franchises involved in the earlier cases. However, the Seattle
team had been established for only two years, and its perform-
ance on the field had been dismal. If the value of a group of
173. Selig, 565 F. Supp. at 526-27.
174. Id. at 526.
175. See supra note 17.
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players is related to their ability and performance, the team
purchased by the Selig group was not much more valuable
than an expansion team.
The Brewers also came with over one hundred minor league
players, which unquestionably added some value to the overall
purchase of players. Yet, if we accept the court's assumption
that the purpose of a minor league system is to develop two to
four major league players per year, then the minor league play-
ers should have added to the value of the major league roster
by fractions, not multiples. The only other noticeable factual
difference is that the Selig case involved baseball while the
earlier cases dealt with football and basketball. However,
there was no evidence in Selig suggesting that baseball players
comprise a higher percentage of their team's value than is the
case in other sports. It is also true that the taxpayer in Selig
improved on earlier cases by using expert allocations that had
been made years before the case, thereby strengthening their
credibility. However, these differences do not appear signifi-
cant enough to explain the very different result.
In Selig, as in the earlier cases, the government was unable
to present persuasive arguments at trial. The government's
economic theories, from the mass asset argument to the re-
gression analysis, met with little success. The government's
attempts at making independent appraisals of the player con-
tracts fared no better; government allocations in the three
cases were described in turn as "thoroughly unpersuasive, "176
"ridiculous,"'177 and "unreliable and irrelevant.' ' 78
As noted above, all three cases dealing with this issue have
concerned events in taxable years before the passage of the
Tax Reform Act of 1976. Perhaps the government will be able
to present a more effective case when the newer provisions be-
come applicable. However, the presumption that no more than
fifty percent of the cost of a team is allocable to player con-
tracts is a rebuttable one, and the result in Selig demonstrates
the ability of expert witnesses to support high allocations.
Since an owner of a sports team will inevitably have access to
better experts than the government, 79 the fifty percent pre-
sumption may not measurably strengthen the government's
176. Laird v. United States, 556 F.2d at 1238 n.22.
177. First Northwest, 70 T.C. at 854.
178. Selig, 565 F. Supp. at 536.
179. The most persuasive experts in the cases discussed herein have been execu-
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position.180 The Selig case thus suggests the possibility that
the corrective provisions enacted by Congress may not be ef-
fective at reducing allocations to player contracts.
VIII
Conclusion
The Selig opinion emphasized that when dealing with player
contracts, the allocation process is necessarily arbitrary.'8 '
The cases support this position, for no accurate method of allo-
cating cost to player contracts has been found. However, the
fact that the process may be arbitrary does not mean it must
be one-sided. Laird and First Northwest are both best ex-
plained as compromises between the competing positions,
while Selig in no way demonstrates such a compromise.
The Laird and First Northwest cases, along with the Tax Re-
form Act of 1976, were part of a general tightening of the tax
treatment of sports teams in the mid-1970's. Perhaps the pen-
dulum has swung back, and amortization of player contracts
will be seen as a subsidy to the sports industry rather than as a
tax sheltering device. 182 However, the policy favoring baseball
was taken too far by the district court in Selig. The appeal in
Selig will turn on policy questions. The Selig decision should
be overturned unless the Seventh Circuit agrees with the dis-
trict court that baseball is so good for Americans that common
sense is not required in the taxation of the sport.
tives active in the sports industry at the time of allocation. An active executive would
be unlikely to appear as an expert for the government.
180. The effect of the 50% presumption may be minimal, for the government always
enjoys a presumption in its favor in tax cases. See, e.g., United States v. Prince, 348
F.2d 746, 748 (2d Cir. 1965). The presumption's main effect will be to serve as a warning
that allocations over 50% may be challenged. See Wiesner, supra note 49, at 92.
181. See supra text accompanying note 173.
182. The Selig court certainly considered tax subsidies appropriate for baseball.
See 565 F. Supp. at 528.
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